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A LL PERSONS connected with aviation insurance should be in
favor of certainty of coverage. It is desirable for the insurance
company and for the insured to know before the loss occurs what is
covered and what is not covered. In the following article, the author
will attempt to point out the problems of uncertainty.
I. MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
Once one obtains a pilot's certificate, it does not expire. However, as
a matter of general knowledge to all pilots and owners, before he is
authorized to use his pilot's certificate, he must have a current medical
certificate.! Therefore, it would seem that the question "Am I covered
if my medical certificate isn't current?" would be simple to answer. Yet
the answer is usually not that simple.
In Royal Indemnity Co. v. John F. Cawrse Lumber Company, Inc.'
an aviation insurance policy's provisions referred to a "valid and cur-
rent" pilot's certificate. The insurance company took the position that
without a current medical certificate the pilot's certificate was not "valid
and current," and, therefore there was no coverage. The court held that
a current medical certificate was not required by this language. "Flown
by a licensed pilot" was held, in Berlanti v. Underwriters at Lloyd's' not
to require a current medical certificate. However, "properly certified
and qualified" under the current regulations does require a current
medical certificate under the holding in Glades Flying Club v. American
Aviation & Marine Ins. Co.' and Baker v. INA.' Similar language,
"while holding proper certificates as required" by regulations was as-
sumed in Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Heaney' to include a current medical
certificate.
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Provisions found in other policies which have not yet been interpreted
by the courts as far as the author is aware are:
(1) "valid and effective pilot certificate." This raises the question,
does the word "effective" mean that one must have a current medical
certificate?
(2) "[iun violation of the terms and limitations of his FAA pilot's
certificate or medical certificate." This raises the same question. While
this phrase at least uses the term, "medical certificate," if the medical
certificate is out of date, is that "in violation of its terms and limita-
tions"? If one doesn't have one, can he be "in violation of its terms and
limitations"? Or, if one, hypothetically, has a commercial pilot's cer-
tificate, a medical certificate over a year old, and is carrying passengers
for hire, is that "in violation of the terms and limitations" of his pilot's
certificate or his medical certificate? This situation is open to interpre-
tation.
Examples of other provisions are:
(1) "valid and effective pilot and medical certificate" and
(2) "with ratings as required by the FAA for the flight involved,"
both reasonably clear in meaning; but consider
(3) "All flights shall be within the limitation of the operating
privilege of the pilot's certificate and ratings," and
(4) "The pilot must have a pilot's certificate and current medical
certificate required by FAA Regulation for the flight involved." The
latter is perhaps the most precise and unambiguous. Courts have often
reasoned that if the insurance company intends to exclude coverage
when the pilot does not have a current medical certificate, why not at
least use those words? It has been effectively argued, "if that's what the
insurance company meant, it was easy enough to say, and since it
didn't, it obviously wasn't intended at the time the policy was written."
The student pilot carrying passengers is a frequently occurring situ-
ation. In Bequette v. National Insurance Underwriters' the court held
that a student carrying passengers was not covered under the policy
provision: "with appropriate ratings required for the flight involved."
Likewise, "duly licensed or certificated pilot" was held in Mang v. The
Travelers Insurance Co.' to deny coverage to a student carrying pas-
sengers since under the circumstances he was not "duly licensed" nor
a "certificated pilot."
In Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McDaniel' the policy in question con-
tained the phrase "in violation of the terms of any FAA pilot certi-
ficate." There a student carrying passengers in a multi-engine aircraft
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was held by the court to be in violation of the terms of his certificate on
two counts, but the court held there was coverage because he was a
named pilot in the pilot warranty clause.
In a recent case, Ranger Ins. Co. v. Culberson,° the terminology
was "holding proper pilot certificate with appropriate ratings as re-
quired by the FAA." Here a student pilot was carrying passengers in
IFR conditions, however, he was a named pilot under the pilot war-
ranty clause and the court held there was coverage.
The phrase "[n]ot properly certified for such operation or in violation
of such certificate during such operation," was involved in Insurance
Company of North America v. Butte Aero Sales and Service.1 There
the court assumed that a man holding a commerical rotor-craft-heli-
copter certificate but who was flying a single-engine aircraft without an
airplane rating was in violation of the policy, but since he was a named
pilot coverage was sustained.
From these cases it appears that regardless of the language the policy
has, where the pilot flying was a named pilot, the courts hold that there
is coverage for the named pilot and have not given binding effect to the
other terms of the policy.
In Roach v. Churchman1' the clause "[i]n violation of the terms and
limitations of his" pilot or medical certificate was involved. In this case,
the contention was made that a violation of FAR 61.47, which requires
that any pilot, no matter what his experience, must have had, within
the last 90 days, five take-offs, five landings to a full stop, between the
hours commencing one hour after sunset and one hour before sunrise
before he can carry a passenger at night in any type of airplane, was "in
violation of the terms and limitations of his pilot's certificate." In other
words, the insurance company wanted to read all of the FAR's into the
pilot certificate. The court held to the contrary, that an FAR was not
a "term, condition, or limitation" on a pilot's certificate.
II. USE OR PURPOSE
Another area in which there is a great deal of controversy, if not
confusion, is under the "business and pleasure" definition, which ex-
cludes "an operation for which a charge is made." To date there are
two reported cases on this point, Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance
Company v. Ivens," and Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York
v. Crist."' In the Ivens case a third party had agreed to pay to the owner
1I I Av. Cas. 5 18,074 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
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and pilot of an aircraft $10.00 an hour in connection with a certain
flight. After the crash the insurance company took the position that this
was a "charge" and therefore in violation of the terms of the policy. The
opinion says that the evidence showed that $10.00 an hour would
barely cover the gasoline and oil and that the normal customary rental
rate or charter rate for this particular type of aircraft was approximately
$30.00 an hour. The court held under those circumstances that the
$10.00 an hour for gas and oil was not a "charge" and that in order for
there to be a "charge" there must be something paid for the use
of the aircraft itself. In other words, just for its use, not for its cost. It is
clear from this opinion that unless there is a profit, something more
than just getting back the cost of operating the aircraft, there is not a
"charge."
Crist was somewhat similar. There it was $15.00 an hour for a single-
engine aircraft. Again, the testimony was that the customary rental or
charter rate on this particular type aircraft was $30.00 an hour, and the
Supreme Court of Arkansas, following Ivens, held that this was not a
"charge," but only a partial recoupment of the cost of operating the
aircraft.
These cases raise some very interesting questions that are not neces-
sarily answered. What did the court mean by the word "cost"? There
are "operating or direct costs" and there are "fixed or indirect costs.""
If the test is the customary rental fee for a particular type of aircraft in
a commercial operation, then $30.00 an hour includes not only the
''operating cost" but also includes the "fixed cost." This $30.00 an hour
is the total cost plus an anticipation of profit based upon a minimum
use of 300 to 500 hours a year.
As long as the payment covers the "operating cost" only, the gas, oil
and reserve for maintenance and overhaul, there is no problem. There
is no profit and the cases are clear.
Suppose, however, one begins to recover some of the "fixed costs,"
the depreciation on the aircraft, the interest paid on the money owed
on the aircraft, the hangar rent and the insurance. Is this a profit to an
individual?
When that individual bought an airplane, he incurred those costs
whether he flies it or not. If he lets another individual use his airplane
and in addition to the "operating costs," he gets something toward his
"fixed costs," the "profit" question is raised. In one sense those costs are
already incurred and anything the owner gets above his "operating
costs" is to some extent, a profit.
The reason that this is a recurring problem is that an airplane is an
expensive piece of equipment, and there are very few people who will
11 Davis, To Buy or Not to Buy, 32 TEX. B.J. 691 (1969).
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just lend an airplane to a friend and say, "Here, George, you just go
use it as long as you want to, doesn't make any difference to me, just
charge the gas and everything to me, and have fun." One might let
someone use his car for a while; but anytime he lets someone use his
aircraft, he expects some of the expenses to be paid. It is very seldom
that there is not something that changes hands, and that is why this is
such a problem, especially since "business and pleasure" is probably
the biggest stated use in light aircraft.
CONCLUSION
Some insurance companies are in the process of rewriting their
policies, or have rewritten them in an attempt to make them better than
their existing policies. They say of their new policy, "it's cleaner, it's
got less exclusions, it has similar language, it's easy to understand, it's
going to eliminate a lot of problems." For this we should be pleased.
However, if such a policy comes out eliminating all exclusions and other
problem areas, perhaps one of the last paragraphs in such a policy may
provide:
Notwithstanding any of the above provisions, it is hereby agreed that
due to the inadequacy of the premium charge, no claims will be paid
for any loss occurring under the terms of this policy. However, in lieu
thereof, upon notification of any such loss, the underwriter will extend
to the insured his deepest sympathy.
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